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I"J THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTJIJ-1 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
EYRH!C RESEll,RCil INSTITUTE, 
E:CORPOPl-\TED I 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
TAX COMMISSION OF Tl-IE STATE OF 
UTAH, and VER~JON L. HOLMAN, R. 
ilILTON YORGASON, ELEANOR LEE 
BRE!Jcrn:~ and DAVID DUNCMJ as 
Cornmissioncors of the Tax Commission 
of the State of Utah, UTAH COUNTY 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, and HARRISON 
CONOVEH, UT.l\H COUNTY ASSESSOR, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDE"JT' S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
Case No. 15320 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE tJATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Writ of Review wherein petitioner is seeking 
a determination as to the tax exempt status under the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah of a nonprofit scientific 
reac;earci1 organization. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was first heard by the Board of County 
Conunis-:i_oners of Utah County sitting as a Board of Equalization. 
-,~ ')ct,,L~r ! ? , 1975, said Board denied tax exempt status to 
1 ,,, u11,l,: 1· the Constitution and statute3 of the State 
1 ,-, l:' i- l.:'LlS appealed to the State Tax Commission Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Utah which held an informal hearing on Jzrnuary 8, 1,17 C. 
(T. R. 83). The Tax Commission then held a formal hear 1· ng 
March 24, 1976 (T.R. 84-86). The Tax Cornn1ission render"'d ire 
decision on the 13th day of June, 1977 (T.R. 87-92), affirmi 
the Utah County Assessor and the County Board of Equalizatio: 
assessment of taxes and denying the exempt status to petitiv 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmation of the decision 
denying petitioner the status of a charity entitled to 
exemption from the personal property tax laws of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With the exception of the additional facts set forth 
below and any conflict that may arise therefrom, the res-
pendents adopt the Statement of Facts as set forth in 
petitioner's brief on appeal. 
$10,000 of Eyring Research Institute's profit was 
used to directly expand the research caoabili ties of t:ynD; 
Research Institute when its president received a $10,000 sa'. 
. · ·th industn bonus in addition to a salary already in line wi · 
standards. (T. R. 21). 
avo1Jec1 goal Petitioner, hereinafter E.R.I., has an · 
of growth (T.R. 17), wherein it holds .itsf•ll c!ll>. to 
-2-
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,erviccs to anyoi1o who wishes to purchase them within general 
.ctandurds of pruc.)ent conduct and within the capabilities of the 
petitioner's staff. To t:1is extent E.R.I. competes in private 
enterprise with any other private management and consulting 
organizution conducting research. (T.R. 50). 
With the exception of one study conducted for a 
rninori ty group, E. R. I. has undertaken no projects to render 
assistance and aid on a gratuitous basis to the indigent or 
needy or to improve the moral, mental or physical welfare of 
the puhlic generally. (T.R. 44). 
E.R.I. performs and willingly accepts research pro-
jects for private business enterprises engaged in business 
fur profit (T.R. 28-31), who can acquire an exclusive pro-
nrietu:::-y interest in the information developed, which it can 
use to its advantage in the market place and who have in fact 
used such information for their pecuniary advantage. (T. R. 
31 and 4:1). 
ARGUNEilT 
POII17 I 
THERE CURI\ENTLY EXISTS NO EXEMPTION FROM THE 
TAXATION or THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF A CHARITABLE 
CORPOT<l','I'ION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OR STATUTES 
OF UT/Ill 
;, ' i ·~ 1 · 'I IT, Section 2 of the Utah Cons ti tut ion now 
l l1· · L,-i/:ett ic1n of 011 tanqible property in the 
-3-
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state when it reads: 
All tangible property in the state, not 
exempt under the laws of the Uni~te-d--S-ta-tes-­
or un<1er this C~msti tut ion, shall be taxed' 
in proportion to its value, to be ascertaTned 
as provided by law. (Emphasis added.) 
The exemptions which could conceivably be found to 
be applicable to Eyring's operation could be either the 
following provision governing real property, 
• lots with the buildings thereon used 
exclusively for either religious worship or 
charitable purposes. .shall be exempt from 
taxation. Art. XIII §2. 
or the permissive grant to the legislature which reads: 
• The Legislature may provide for the 
exemption from taxation of homes, homesteads, 
and personal property, not to exceed $2,000 in 
value for homesteads, and all household furnishings, 
fixtures and equipment used exclusively by the 
owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining 
a home for himself and family. Art. XIII ~2. 
The latter provision is an ambiguous sentence which 
can be construed in different ways. One possibility is to 
note that the entire sentence except the clause "and personi. 
property" explicitly concerns the home and property used 
therewith. In light of the awk\-1ard construction of the 
sentence which places a limit on the amount of exempti~ 
allowed immediately after "personal property" and not afte: 
the word "homesteads" upon which the limit 1·1as placPcl it 
becomes arguable that the drafters of the constitution wet' 
intending to provide the legislature with .cm <'!'1" 11 u•n>! 
-4-
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bz 
",. 0 ,1 ti:ccr )H·orcrty t.Jx exemptions to individuals in their 
~~ership of personally used property. 
Such an interpretation picks up support when one 
observes the construction of this same provision prior to the 
1958 P,mendment. 
The provision read : 
The legislature may provide for the exemption 
from taxation of homes, homesteads, and personal 
property, not to exceed $2,000 in value for homes 
and homesteads, and $300 for personal property. 
After reading the two versions of this same basic 
provision it seems conceivable that when the people voted 
~ replace the phrase "and $300 for personal property" with 
"and all household furnishings, fixtures, and equipment used 
exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in 
maintaininq a home for himself and family" that their intent 
i:as to provide an inflation adjusting change necessary to 
ensure that all of an individual's personalty was exempt. 
That is to say, they substituted a different limitation on 
the a:no-1Jn J...c "' 1 h ld b ,_ d OL Persona property t at cou . e exemp~e • 
~ther than $300, which initially rnay have been sufficient 
to provide exemption for an individual's household furnish-
ings' etc., the people provided that all such i terns were to 
be e x~mpt as long as used in maintaining a place of abode. 
,,·loptinr_J this construction only provides the 
-_ ri_ j _
1
: 
. r· 1 I 01·1"" lunity of exempting personal property 
-5-
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used in connection v1ith ;1 honl•' or ntlH'r pl<Jcn of ubn_' 
would deprive the petitioner of its claim lo iH1 E'>:ciritio,; 
from taxation of its personal pro;:ic1_-Ly used in carryinci 01,, 
its commercial endeavors since corpor<-tte propertv, evc,:i th:,-
of a charity, could find no constitutionally sanctioned 
exemption. 
Another possible alternative to the above constrnc• 
of this exemption provision is to read the sentence so as 
to grant the legislature the power to exempt (1) hoMes; 
(2) homesteads, with a limit of a $2000 exemption for eacr,; 
( 3) unlimited power to exempt all personal property, 11here"1 
situate and by whomever owned and used; and (4) all househc' 
furnishings, fixtures and equipment with the limi tatio 11 th;' 
such i terns may only be exempted if used exclusivelv by the 
owner at his place of abode and only if the item is used i~ 
maintaining a home. 
Adopting this construction would provide petitioner 
an opportunity of claiming it may be entitled to the n:,ceS'c 
constitutionally sanctioned exem~tion. This e~:e:"'ptior. de;;~ 
upon the E.R.I. 's ability to find a statute wherein the le,:' 
ture exercised its power. 
' lf 
The only legislation which seeris to concern itse 
with charities and their ownershiri and use of prof-wrh is 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) §§ 59-2-30 Lo 31. 
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... 
This section is intended to clarify the 
scope of exemptions for property used 
cxciusivelv for either religious worship 
or charitable purposes provided for in section 
2 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the 
state of Utah. This section is not intended 
to expand or limit the scope of such exemptions. 
Any property whose use is dedicated to religious 
worship or charitable purposes including property 
which is incidental to and reasonably necessary 
for the accomplishment of such religious worship 
or charitable purposes, intended to benefit an 
indefinite numer of persons is exempt from 
taxation if all of the following requirements 
are met: 
(1) The user is not organized to provide a 
profit from the use of the property. 
(2) No part of any net earnings, from the 
use of the property, inures to the benefit of 
anv private shareholder or individual, but 
any net earnings shall be used directly or 
indirectly, for the charitable or religious 
purposes of the organization. 
(3) The property is not used or operated by 
the organization or other person so as to benefit 
any officer, trustee, director, shareholder, 
lessor, member, employee, contributor, or any 
other person through the distribution of profits, 
payment of excessive charges or compensations. 
(4) Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or 
abandonment of the user no part of any proceeds 
derived from such use will inure to the bcnef it 
of any private person. 
Respondents sub~it that this provision was not the 
result of the legislature's exercising its constitutional 
authnr lo "providf' for the exemption from taxation of 
· · · pcr':onal propertv." Respondents reach this conclusion 
b·c \·:a.,, r c lh t. 11 · 1 · 
' ,. c o ow1ng ana ysis. 
-7-
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The first t~o sentences set forth the inLc~t u 
lesrislu.ture in pussing the provision and clcfin.2 s th" 
I;_ scop,-
of its enact~ent. 1\fhen the first sentence rei.lds, "This sw 
is intended to clarify the scope of exemptions for propert, 
used exclusively for either religious worship or ch_aritab~ 
purposes provided for in section 2 of Article XIII of the 
Constitution of the state of Utah," it directs the reac1er 
to go to Article XIII Section 2 of the Utah Constil.ution 
find the exemption dealing with the use of propert~' "used 
exclusively for either religious worship or charitable 
purposes." In doing so one finds a particular provision th' 
reads: ". • lots with the buildings thereon use_c_1__exclusi' 
for either religious worship or charitable purposes (the c,:, 
phraseology used in section 30). . sh al 1 be exen1p t fror, 
taxation." It is to be noted that this provision of the 
cons ti tut ion only deals with real property--lots 1·: l th the 
buildings thereon. It cannot be said that section 30 1,•as 2 
attempt to exercise the constitutional grant to e·.:i•rnpt 
personal property from taxation. 
. . . c~c1clecl c,upport frOJ1i th' Such an interpretation gains " ~ 
following sentence of section 30. It reads, 11 This sectiofl 
is not intended to expand or limit the scope of such 
1 . 'tl - sl iteci t~·· The legislature could be said to have exp ici Y · ' 
-8-
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s~ct i o;.; " " 
The Commission submits that there currently exists 
rC' c::C?r1c;tion fror;i taxo.tion of the personal property of a 
charity in Utah under either construction of the Constitutional 
provision dealing \·Ti th the legislature's pmver to grant 
execipt.ions from property taxation. Since the Constitution 
provides that all tangible prooerty in the state not exempt 
undPr the Cons ti tut ion is taxable, the Commission urges this Court to 
affin1 the decision of the Utah State Tax Commission in 
denying Eyring Research Institute an exer:iption from 
taxation of its personal property. 
POI\JT II 
PF.TIT lO:ff:E' S COMl'!ERCIAL ACTIVITIES 1\PB ~JOT CHARITABLE 
Fl i·Jl\TURE AS THEY DO :JOT RELIEVE STATE AND LOCAL 
GO\JI:R;~tlENTS OF ANY BURDKJ ;WR DO THE:Y EXTEND DIRECT 
TO TllE CL:tiERAL PUBLIC 
i~'nli::c o';::.'.1e:r- c:1a.ritable cases C.ecideci heretofore by 
this court 1·1here traditional charitable activities have been 
the instant controversy presents a 
-9-
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questi0'1 of first irnprcssion--can an oryani zat iol! "'''Jo ;::c 
co!11IT1ercial endeavor that does not gratuitously ]Jrondc uir 
benefit to the general public be titled a charity? 
The Utah Supreme Court has had several opµortuniti:·: 
to rule in the charitable exemption area of Utah law, but 
each instance the case presented a fact situation wltere 
traditional charitable activities were being carried on. ~ 
Salt Lake Lodge '.'Jo. 85 B.P.O.E. v. Groesbeck_, 40 Utah 1, )!,, 
P. 192 (1911); Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks :10.: 
v. Tax Commission, 'J3G P. 2d 1214 (Ctal1 1975); Bak•0 r v. On·• 
Piece of Imoroved Real Propert~·, 570 P. 2d 1023 (Utah 19771: 
entities seeking exemption were eng:iged in traditional chaff' 
activites such as aid to the poor, needy and destitute. 
In the above cases as well as Youth Tennis 1·~: 
v. Tax Commission, 554 P. 2d 220 (Utah 197G), volu11tary lace: 
another traditional charitable activity, was utiliz.cd to 
effectuate the carrying out of the various charitc1hle purpos; 
In the instant case, however, we find a cor[Joration ''' 
professio:E1l individuals drawing a salary on the p.ir ':'it> t. 
paid in the industry. The services renderc:d are bou9iit anc 
th~ e"~111sivc paid for and in several instances are used to ~ .. ~ 
and pecuniary advantage of the entity for whom the 
has been performed. 
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J\:1 al most- iclcn ticzl1 ca!'iC' to the instant one i_nesc::nl~ed 
~t :cl t to thr su0re:<1P Court of Minne so ta recently. In 
·:ort'.1_§_tar _ _F~csearch Institute v. County of Hennepin, 236 N.W. 
/cl 754 (1975), rehearing denied 236 N.\·L 2d 767, the Minnesota 
court was faced with the issue of deciding whether a non-profit 
corporation which was engaged in applied research was 
entit.led to a tax exemption as a ''purely public charity", which 
is akin to our constitutional requirement that the proDerty 
seehng exemption be used "exclusively for . . charitable 
µurpos es . 11 
Like E.R.I.'s operation, the research organization 
in the ~1innesota case, North Star Research Institute, provided 
research services in significant degree at the request of 
Federal and State governmental agencies with a substantial 
a~unt of services being performed for private organizations. 
Examples of the research provided: The discovery of commercial 
uses for woste products; the discovery of devices to control 
ro:lert:::· in grain storage facilities; the analysis and refine-
eie::t o~ (Hlli:-ig ar:d accounting arocedures; etc. --all similar 
ir, n0ture to E • · 
.R.I. s prOJeCts. 
J-~v0;1 after finding that :-iorth Star Research was not 
0P~ratc' 1 i £or the prcuniary advantage of the individuals 
\.hr, Inc:titute and that any profits which 1.vere 
. . ~ i 
i ' II 1 Ln irnnrovc t~e research potential of 
-11-
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::orth Star, th2 l!inn2sota court hcl,1 tlvtt ;Jnrt'.: '.oLi: "c,., 
Institute failetl to sustain its burden of D · 
- ~ rovJ_n9 c.;nti~lc, 
to exemption when it held: 
(1) To be exempt from taxation, property 
must be put to a use which is purely charitabl~ 
and public; 
(2) A significant part of the use to which 
the property of North Star is put involves 
applied research for private business enter-
prises engaged in business for profit; 
(3) Any private business contracting with 
North Star to conduct research acquires an 
exclusive proprietary interest in the infor-
mation developed, which it can use to its 
advantage in the market place and which, if 
it sees fit it can preclude others from using 
by obtaining patents; 
( 4) The fact that a substantial part of t 11e 
research is done for governmental agencies, ff'::lera: 
and state, does not make North Star "purely" 
charitable and public; 
(5) If the research done for private enterpr:" 
is so minimal in comparison to the total as to be'.: 
no legal consequence, the record fails to derno:is':r': 
it. 
E.R.I's Articles of Incorporation set fort~ its 
in the public interest, but its articles also grant the ;;o::: 
r· 
to do research for profit making entities Hhen Article-'· 
therein reads: 
The purposes for which th0 corporation is 
formed are: 
of 
* * * 
(d) Tn pronotc and fo~tor 
science in t~1~ c1Pveloo ..... 1•·n t 
and industr-/ 
-12-
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·c2tlC"Ic'2r hJ.s utilizcu this L:rnguage to provide 
c0rviccs to several non-governmental entities such 
a t 1~rocessing con;:Ja11y, a mushroom processing company, 
·~-~ta1~ Sell, Uta~ Power antl Light, etc., which all utilize 
... ·o infor'T'.ution in their profit making activities. 
T:1e l-!inne?sota court found suc)1 a power dispositive 
-.;2;1 it stated at length: 
A second characteristic of ~orth Star, and the 
critical one, is that information developed as a 
result of the research is not nade available to the 
public generally or to industry generally. Instead, 
the knowledge becomes the exclusive pro?erty of the 
0jrofit-mai~ing enterµrise for which it was researched. 
It is aporopriate, and probably necessary, that 
this exclusive entitlement to the product of the 
research be granted to the business organization which 
requested and, in part at least, paid for it. But 
a process which enables one business to improve 
its competitive position wit~ respect to others 
in the same field cannot be said to be a "charity" 
as that term has been generally understood, even 
in its broadest sense. And the ;iurpose of improving 
directly L1e profit-ma}~ing '.:iotential of a private 
':Juc;iness is not a "public purpose" in a sense 
comparable to such purposes as the relief of poverty 
and sickness, the generally dissemination of know-
ledge, and the encouragement of religion, science, 
and the arts. "Charity" in the strict sense and 
2c~lied researc~, w~ether motivated directly and 
-'--~--·:'Jia.":.c J. .. t~· ~:.'.i:-:~2:--!i ::aria:-~ c'.J:--:.siderations or 
-:-:-=:_-1:;::.Ger~,--= "",s ·=<: :::r::.:it, ar2 ::cL.~i i!".1"'.")0rtant to t:1e 
social welfare. T~e difference lies ln the fact 
th::o.t. ilpplied research immediately and directly 
r~lated to ~rofit-nakino activities is better able 
t.hun purel . charitabie ~ctivities to share the burdens 
') _: tax.:: ti C) ~-, • 
co•;r'_ i"1s inJirectly indicated that a co1mnercial 
2 1t1or nav orevent the entitv from attaining 
-13-
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Some cases dctc:rmining property ~'artially tad 
clo so on the basis that ti1e property is partiall 
used. for commercial purposes, eg., renti~g of a' 
portion of the pro)Jerty, even though the rents au 
applied for charitable purposes. Here we have no. 
question of co=ercial use versus charitable usE; 
because there is no )art of t'.1e subject premises 
which are used commercially - no part is rented 
and no income is received. 536 P.2d at 1217 tolS. 
Petitioner cites definitions given by various cou'f 
to the term charity. A COITlI'lOn thread found runniny in sue.~ 
definitions and the one relied on by E.R.I. for its exc~oti 
is the lessening of the burdens of government. Th c~ courts 
found this criterion to be important since the pocver to t;x 
rests upon necessity and is essentL1l to t':1e exisLcnce oft 
state in its efforts to provide services to meet the genen. 
welfare needs of its citizens. The Cons ti tu ti on 1i.1s carver 
out an exemption from sharing the burdens of government for 
ties, which exemption the courts have found to be based up~· 
· ' h · 1 t rec;~ive be!10fits f~c:ri premise tnat t e state is presurne0 o __ 
the property of charities equivale~t at least to tl1c public 
revenue that would otherwise be derived from iL. 
In the instant controversy the state or in the 
instance of the pro;::ierty ta:< involved hE:rein its politic~! 
l r1ot l_.('cciVP subdivisions who receive the tax revenue co 
henefits \·Jhich relieve the burden of ;,1·,,\•1·:!111'1 l''' 11 c:ic 
-14-
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ri1-ni l'ction, ci. ty an:l county rodr1 systems, watc~r 
, 0i1d tlir' multitucle of other local services. 
Jct 5 presented at the hearing indicate that in terms of 
percent of its efforts go to Federal 
governmc,11t projects which only remotely would ever ease the 
burclcn on the local governments which provide services to 
Eyrinq Hesearch Institute. Even more obvious is the 
[act the very city providing the services mentioned was 
required to pay $17,265.00 to E.R.I. for some research as to 
the impact of locating a resort in the Provo area. Even 
assumincJ that such activity is of the type that the govern-
ment would ordinarily find necessary to preserve the general 
,,.1clfctre of its citizens, and hence would fit one of the legal 
requi.reJTlents that charities provide services for the public 
1
·1elfart", the fact remains the burden on Provo and its 
tazpayrrs w0s in no way lessened as they presumably paid 
the fair market value for the services rendered! 
This situation hardly seems of the type that the 
~-:::-:::--:_.srs o: the Cons~itution 2nC Statutes of Vtah in.tended 
co f,•::~j-·.2 c;pecial tax treatment. Anot'.'ler fact brought out 
at f:ormul !tearing which indicates that E.R. I. 1 s operation is 
if f~r "t"··c . 1 . h . . h . t bl 
- - - "-"- ' commercia in nature t an it is c ari a e 
11
' 
0
"""
1i:c 0 is th0 fact that E.R.I. 's president received a 
J,i,r ~-'''1 honu~ for a joh well done in 1975. Respondents 
-15-
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submit that individuals cncpqed jn chilritabl<~ activir_i,,~ 
usually would not be expectinq r~onetary rc':.'ards for such 
activity. In fact, this seems to deprive the activity of 
its charitable nature altogether. 
Petitioner cites judicial language to the effect 
that a charity's engaging in commercial activities will 
not deprive it of its charitable status. However, 
Youth Tennis Foundation of Utah v. Tax Commission, ::_upra, 
cited by petitioner, stated the rule to be that comr;iercial 
activities that are "incidental to and consistent with 
charitable purposes do not change. • [the] character [of 
the charity) or deprive it of its attendant protections." 
554 P.2d at 223. 
The case at hand does not fit the case to which 
such language was aimed--where a charity with cleacly 
established charitable purposes and activities engages ~ 
incidental activities such as the selling of goods in 
competition with private enterprise. Here, where the 
entity's entire activities are commercial in nature the 
rule is simply not applicable. 
Justice Maughan continued in Youth Tennis by stati"----~----
that as long as the charity's incidental commercial 
were correlated to the prudent management of its 
in accomplishing its commitment to supportillCJ the 
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th<:: 11101.ul, rnc11tctl and physiccil welfare of the public. 
,:;r payn1ent of a $10,000.00 bonus, substantial in any 
husiness settiny, in adclition to the E.R.I.'s president's 
clready competitive salary simply does not seem to be the 
1rndcnt management of resources toward lessening the burdens 
nf government ctnd improving the quality of life of man. 
Such a reward seems unnecessary for an individual working 
for the betterment of man. 
POINT III 
THE BURDEN IS UPON THE APPLICANT TO ESTABLISH 
EXEMPTION FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION, AND SAID 
EXEMPTIONS WILL NOT BE AIDED BY JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION BUT MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED 
AGAINST APPLICANT. 
The basic premise in all property tax cases has 
been that 011 tangible property situate in the State of Utah 
is subject to taxation. Article XIII Section 2 Utah Const. 
Exemptions from this basic premise are provided. This Court 
~as provided the tests to be used in ascertaining when the 
In !'~rke.£__~'1..:_Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961 (1901), 
Court stated the general rule to be: 
.all property of what kind soever, 
a1 111 by whornso<;ver owned is subject to taxation; 
~nrl when any kind of property is exempt, it 
'',,w;titutcerc> an exception to this rule. •rhe 
11
' "1' tile rule is that it is just and 
: "I d•I,, I J1,1t every species of property within 
-17-
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the state should be0r its equul pcoport iJ):i 
of the burc1ens of the qovcrnrient. ',!he;-;, 
therefore, an ovner clJims that certain 
property is exempt from taxation, the burden 
is upon him to show that it falls within the 
exception. ~_£1__~Xemption_ wi__JJ,__~ot be aided by 
judicial interpretation. It must Se-shown to 
exist by express -terms o-Cth._e_enactmen-Cl·1l1'Ccl1 it;, 
claimed grants it. 'The presumption i-sthat-211--=-
exemptions intended to be g-ranted werc>--,Tr-cin-feci-
in express terms. In such cases the~-ulc;--or~­
strict constru-ction -a:D-plTc~-and;-in--ordc>r--fo 
relieve any species of pr-operty from i tsd-i:ie-
and just proportion of the burdens of t~-­
government, the language relied on as crcatinq 
the exemption should be so cleEi-rasriotto adr;it 
of reasonable controversy about its meaning; 
for all doubts must be resolved against the 
exemption. The power to tax rests upon necessi~ 
and is essentia1- to the existence of the state.' 
(Emphasis added.) 
An exception to this general rule would scern to h,,, 
been carved out as noted in Benevolent and Protective Ordil _ 
Elks No. 85 v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 536 P.' 
1216 (Utah 1975), when the Court stated: 
• There is, however, an exception to 
this general rule, and statutes exempting propert•· 
used for educational and charitable purposes or 
for public and charitable purposes or for public . 
worship, under the great weight of authority, sho •. 
receive a broad and :c:::ire libecal const:-'.lc~i"~· t·or. 
those exempting procertv used with a view to 
or profit only. Th~ re~son for the rule is th 3 c:, 
· 1 - lus1l'elv the state, by exempting property usec exc -" 
for one or more of the purposes mentioned froP 
taxation, is presumed to receive benefits froP 
the property ~quivalent at le2st to the public 
revenue that would otherwise be derivecJ frori it. 
f ,. rr " 
Respondents would submit th2t this rule o cnn" 
does not aid E.R.I. in the inst2nt controvors 
-18-
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tnz 
le: "S 1 :, tc:1clecl l.ci !Jc applied in cases like Salt Lake Loder'" 
;J Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192 (1911). Benevolent and Protective 
nder of Elks No. S':l v. Tax Com:nission, supra; where traditional 
-----~ ---~---- -------· 
c'iuitable activities were taking place. The issue was whether 
those chadtable activities were sufficient in light of other 
activities to entitle the entity to claim exemption under a 
ectrticular provision of statute or constitution. The rule 
is to broadly construe the statute to see if it allows the 
e:ility to use it to gain tax exemption as a charity. 
?espondents will submit that the issue before this Court is 
t':hether the activities of E.R.I. are charitable, and not 
1·hethe1 E. P.. I. 's charitable activities are of the type or 
of sufficient number to entitle it to an exemption llnder 
the Utah Constitution and Statutes granting exemption. 
0 cspondents will stipulate that if petitioner's 
research activities are charitable then it is entitled to 
a tax eYcrnption. The intent of the above argument is to 
~"ese'lt t;1e oro:-iosi tiori that doubts as to the charitable 
nsture of E.R.I. 's research activities should be construed 
j:i fuvor of tuxation. 
This posturP was enunciated by a Massachusetts court 
i· Il'-'_:S_t()n ~-l2'.'.:"1_b_c.T_ _oJ_S:onul15'.:.!S:_e__~Assessors of Boston, 315 
:·.s. 712, 5~ ll.~.2.1 J'l9 (1954), wherein the court stated: 
-19-
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_,,,,.. 
Notwithstdnding the law's acknowleJqm~n~ 
o~ the mani Fold new forms in which charity rnilv 
fJ_nd expression, the more remote the objcccts ~iid 
mc0 ~hods become from the traditionally recogni 2 ,-.f: 
obJ ects and methods the more care must be taken 
to preserve sound principles and to avoid umic:a,111 
exemptions from the brudens of govcrnJTtent. This 
statement becomes especially pertinent v1here the 
alleged charity operates in the fields of trade 
and commerce. * * * A foundation for indusLrial 
research for the sole purpose of discovering anr' 
making generally available more efficient methods o'. 
production and distribution might be a ch0ritv. B, 
of the multitude of trade organizations and -
associations existing today in all branches of 
industry and commerce it is believed that few 
could pass the test. 
The petitioner cited language of the Color0do Suore 
Court decision in United Presbyterian Association _v~ Comm1s:' 
?f County of Jefferson_, 167 Colo. 485, 448 P.2d %7 (1969), 1 
also picks up this distinction. 
The Colorado court stated: 
Our prior decisions have consistently zHlherd 
to the princiole that charitable purpose _<L' __ a~ end 
will be strictly construed, but if the end be 
clearly established as charitable then thr' rneans 
used to achieve that end will be liberal~\'_ c_onstru_i:__ 
as a use for chari tablce purpo-se:---CEmphas i_:; added.I 
The rule statins; that stat<Jtes iw•ol•.'inJ charit>bi' 
d rlo t in L:cnded to exemptions are to be broadly construe was 
provide a broad and liberal interpretation of whJt is a rho' 
- . I court Is lantJllilgc i~ This is illustrated by picking up t1e L 
-2()-
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And inanifcstly the purpose of the statute 
in l'YcmptinCJ propertv usecl for charitable 
purposes is to encourage the promotion of 
institutions and organizations having for 
their object the care and maintenance of the 
indigent and destitute citizen, the helpless 
orphan and the poor who are sick and afflicted, 
and whose charity and ministrations in these 
respects correspondingly relieves the state of 
such burdens. 120 Pac. at 8 to 9. 
Since the sole issue before this court is whether 
E.R.I. is a charity at all, the rule of statutory construction that 
nrovides that exemption statutes are to be liberally construed 
to see if they apply to the subject charity is simply not 
applicable to the case at bar wherein the dispute centers on 
·.·;hether a charity even exists. 
POINT IV 
EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED 
SO AS NOT TO OVERBURDEN NONEXEMPT TAXPAYERS WITH 
PAYING MORE THAN THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE COSTS OF 
GOVERNMENT. 
Found throughout the decisions discussing exemptions 
from taxation is the basic taxing premise that all propert? 
for suc]i u premise is that it is just and equitable that every 
SYJeciE·::.; of property should bear its equal proportion of the 
01Jrdcn::> 0f quvernment .. Inherent in this premise is the fact 
0 11 r·opcrty requires many if not most of the services 
In case of fire, the 
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- ' l!' 
property is sold, sellers anc~ bu\'ecs usu~; 11~· ru': 0 
of the recording system. Exarnp]('S c;o 0:1 2nd on. ::J,,n 
a property becomes exempt fror1 ta:<ation it shifts 
the cost of the services the government pro·rides on:o 
nonexempt entities. As the number of exemptions c;ro.,s 
in a taxing area, the amount of tax required o E non-
exempt taxpayers correspondingly increasc::s. 1'/hile 
the statistical data is not available which would 
indicate the value of the property lost listed on t~ 
tax rolls due to exemptions, several other areas of the 
country have such data available. In a report pcepared b. 
the Citizens Budget Commission, Inc., of New York 
., 
entitled Real Estate Tax Exem2!_ions: TiBe F~_it_C:.,~n';c 
published in April of 1977, it was indicated that tile 
assessed value of tax exempt properties in New York Ci~ 
amounted to $25,208 million. This had the effect of fo·c-
going S2, 216 million in real estate til.xes which would he· 
acded 70 ;:iercent to the S3, 122 :-i.llio:-i ·~·f cc1l ('S~ 3 ::c 
believed collectible. 2 Of this uDoc1nl 
that $334 million was lost due to non-governmental, 
. 3 
charitable type exemption. 
1 Available at 110 East 42ncl Strec't, ll,.,,. Yn1·k, i]e\': 
10012 (212) 687-07] 1. 
2 Ic1. at 1. 
3 Icl. ot 'J. 
-22-
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ii'1~ o'i the distr-ibution of thE' tax burden. With the 
er10;·1n,)us value lost from the tax base due to exemptions, 
rcsponients urge this Court to seriously look at its 
1udicial decisions and the direct impact they have on 
the shifting of the tax burden onto the already distraught 
citizen-taxpayer. 
If the citizenry wanted to expand its tax subsidiza-
tion of worthy causes to include educational and scientific 
enterprises, let them make it express; as they did in the 
Federal taxing scheme wherein scientific enterprises are 
afforded an express tax subsidy. Utah's taxation of real 
property does not find any Federal counterpa1l and the 
constitutional exempting language governing cha1ities is 
si9nificcrntly different than the Federal langu.t11e. In this 
respect the following language of this court in Friendship 
1'1_i1_12__CJ_£_~_~1]-)_. __ -""-~ Tct~Commis__,,_~o~, 26 Utah 2d 227, t\87 P.2d 1272 
s ta tc-cl : 
In this regard the court 
The fctct that plaintiff is exempt From 
fcJeral tctxation under the provisions of 
the- Jntcrn21l Revenue Code, is not determinative, 
although the nonprofit aspect would be a 
nr.~ccssa 1·y inqreclient of a qualifying 
chc1r[tci!il0 operution. 487 P.2cl at 127G to 77. 
-23-
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for subsidization of scientific 011tccqjriscc; is :.ir.,,,1. 
not justified in this case. 
The Conunission would also urc3c the Court to not~·~ .. 
fact that most corporations, profit and non-profit., provici: 
valuable and needed services to the citizenry. Th0 fact 
that Petitioner is a nonprofit corporation provicllng a 
highly regarded service cannot be dispositive in light of 
the fact t1:1at about one-sixth4 of all corporutions in Utah 
are incorporated under the nonprofit laws of Utail. To 
broaden the charitable status to include non-profit corpora:. 
providing needed and beneficial service could conceivably 
have an enormous impact on the tax base. Responde11 t:s siP•.0 1. 
urge the Court to review the propriety of extendinc1 the scoec 
of the charitable exemption any further than it is 
POINT V 
OC.l A \\i'RIT OF REVIEW THE COM!HSSION' s DECI:;J1)~! Sf!OJcc' 
ONLY BE DISTURBED IF FOUND TO BE ARBITTu\RY ;1:JU CA?i::' 
This Court has held with the majority of Courts tr:?· 
''[bl r '. ., . 1 .I--. '' - _, l. c'1 t..ri.·c_ ,ulnini:::t~:· ecause O::!:: t:.1e res-rJor;sioi lLies -,,,;icn ,_., .. 1_: 
tive agency is charged, and its presumed knowledge ,ind exo,: 
in thut field . Con ri' dt~.r·c· lile free:. it should b~ allowed ~ 
of action, with as little judicial interference as 
4 (' f :; I l 1 .- ·' (l ff l···: Statistics obtuined from the Secrntarl 
,January 5, 1979, sho\\'ir1<J J tot;cd of ~'.l, 71 1 L~,i 1 i·i·.". 
and of: that number 6,GC)2 beiriq irh~or1•nr,1t 1 ,J :r' 
profit corporution luws of Utah. 
-24-
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[ t:1~· courts] arcc rc:luctant to intrude into the agency's 
,,_tc:rn1initiuns, and will not do so unless it a2pears th;it 
ariency has cic ted in excess of its authority, or so un-
reasondbly that it should be deemed capricious and arbitrary.•· 
Beirne v. Mitchell, llo. 15482 (Utah, November 15,1978). 
Respondents submit that it was soundly reasonable for 
the Commission to have denied exempt status to a scientific 
organization where no clear exemption can be found in the 
Ltah Cons ti tut ion, statutes or decisions. 
COl"CLUSION 
The Utah Constitution currently provides for the 
taxation of all tangible prop2rty in the state except if 
exempted by the laws of the United States or the Utah Consti-
tution. The only ex£)res s exemption found in the cons ti tutio!' 
is for lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for 
Chari table ['Urpose S. Since the prooerty in dispute is personal 
~IO?erty, this exemi::ition is inapplicable. The only other 
exe~ution a9plicable to E~ring Research Institute's 
uraperty is one enabling the legislature to exempt 
ccrtciin ot 11er classes of property. This provision can be 
tcd so as to only grant the legislature the oppor-
property used by an individual in 
Ti1is interpretation leaves petitioner 
c,', L11c leCji s la ture has failed to expressly 
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to a charity. 
the Utah code conceivably dealing with personal 
a charity, Section 59-2-30, provides tliat it is only in:c·: 
to clarify the exemption granted to chariliL's 1-.·_i th lots c: 
buildings. After listening to all legislative deb1te co:-
cerning Utah Code Annotated §59-2-30, this writer can re]:, 
to the Court that the entire debate centered on 1·:ly, s'.10J'.. 
exempt and never even hinted that the legislo.turc tlloug~t 
they 1·1ere picking up their heretofore dormant cons l. i tut:c .. 
power to exclude a charity's personal property fror.1 the :. 
rolls. Respondents submit that there currently exists no 
provision in Utah la1v exempting petitioner's persn11al proo,· 
regardless of its characterization as a ci1arity 01· 11onc~ 0 r: 
For purposes of arguing against the peti t 10! 1C'r' s ;,. ! 
position that it is a charitable organization ent.i tlerl to 
that :> property exemption, the Commission would point out 
granting of a $10,000.00 bonus to its presiclent d";>rivest· 
corporation of its non~ro::i t status as such an a··~ 
tutes no more than a return of :-xcofil tc a.i offic 0 : 1 
corporation in direct contravention of the requi rcr:i:nts 
0
: 
enjoying nonprofit status. 
:_:ta ted ~ Since this Court has 
non0rofit status is essential to a 
. , ,,i11imin' 
corporation ;; 
that it ic; entitled to an excmr,tion as 
has deprived it~clf of any clai~ for ch _1 1· l L 1:: 1 · 
-2G-
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for ti1,,' ta>: year in which the bonus was paicl. 
Secondly, the cornmissio:i \IOuld urge the Court to 
· 1 tnc tact that petitioner is engaged entirely in comn1ercial 
acci1cities and never gratuitously offers its so called 
charitable services to the public as rendering E. R. I. incapable 
of claiming exempt status. Such commercial activities place 
petitioner in a different clas3 of organization than has 
0reviously been the subject of review by this Court. The 
decisions which have hacl such an op2ortunity have held that 
while the commercial activity engaged in by a research organiza-
tion is commendable that they do not amount to charitable 
activity entitling the entity to claim an exemption. 
The fact that petitioner engages in activities which 
?rovide highly regarded beneficial services can not be persuasive 
since most businesses, profit and r.onprofit, provide similar 
services. 
to exist. 
This must follow or such corporations would cease 
Petitioner's activities entail the performing of 
rese2:rc·1 :er ;)ri1I2-'c.e e:lterpriss -.-.-~i:::--1 r:::sy use the information 
for its own exclusive and pecuniar1 use. Such activity is 
simply not charitable in the sense that the constitutional 
intended in providing for exemption from taxation. 
f<espondents urge this Court to sustain the Commission's 
~C'c ;, ~ '·')'' :> ': not bc i nq arbi tr ar'/ nor capricious· 
- 27-
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D.7\TED this 9t~ da~' of Januai:y, l'.J79. 
Resp~ctEully suLmittcG, 
ROBERT B. HA"SJ:::J 
Attorney General of Uw state: 
_l}JLz~{ 
MARK K. BUCHI . 
Assistant Attorney Gener~ 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
State Tax Commission 
CERTIFICATE OF ~LAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct. 
postage pre-paid, of Respondents Brief on Appeal to Mr. ~ 
Dayle Jeffs, Attorney for Petitioner, 90 North llHI East, Pre 
Utah 84601, on this day of January, 1970. 
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